We investigate whether investor anticipation of future performance differs between union and nonunion firms following corporate layoff" announcements. Using eventstudy methodology and multivariate regression analysis, we find that the stock market reaction to layoff announcements is negatively related to nonunion firms and positively related to union firms.
I. Introduction
Several recent studies in the strategic management literature have investigated the relationship between layoff announcements and shareholder wealth and have shown that certain characteristics of the announced layoff act as signals which guide investors' reactions to the announcement (Lee, 1997; Ursel and Armstrong-Stassen, 1995; Worrell et al., 1991) . Another research stream in the industrial relations literature has investigated the influence of union-related announcements on shareholder wealth, including strikes (Becker and Olson, 1989), union organizing (Ruback and Zimmerman, 1984) , union decertification (Pearce et al., 1995 ), bargaining (Abowd, 1989 , concession bargaining (Becker, 1987) , and introduction of profit-sharing plans (Florkowski and Shastri, 1992) . This research generally supports the idea that union-related announcements affect shareholder wealth.
Taken together, these two research streams suggest the possibility that investors' reactions to layoff announcements may be conditioned by the firm's union status. To date, no published study in either the strategic management literature or industrial relations literature has examined this topic. This study determines whether investors' reactions to layoff announcements differ between union and nonunion firms. We conduct our investigation using event-study methodology and multivariate analysis in a sample of union and nonunion firms making layoff announcements over the period 1989-1996. JOURNAL OF LABOR RESEARCH of layoffs in U.S. corporations during this time has sparked much research on how layoffs affect shareholder wealth. Worrell et al. (1991) used an event-study methodology to show an overall significant, negative investor reaction to layoff announcements. Similar reactions have been observed in Canadian (Ursel and Armstrong-Stassen, 1995) and Japanese corporations (Lee, 1997), suggesting that a layoff announcement often confirms or signals to investors a firm's financial problems (Worrell et al., 1991) .
Although layoff announcements decrease shareholder wealth in the aggregate, investors' reactions will likely vary according to information they seek and obtain on characteristics of both the announcement and the firm. For example, investors tend to react more negatively to layoffs at firms with poor financial performance prior to the announcement (Ursel and Armstrong- Stassen, 1995; Worrell et al., 1991) . Furthermore, proactive layoff announcements --those citing attempts to improve firm efficiency or profitability --have a smaller negative impact on shareholder wealth than reactive layoff announcements --those citing declining demand or financial distress as motivating the layoff (Lee, 1997; Worrell et al., 1991) . Research has also shown a negative relationship between shareholder wealth and the percentage of workers that a firm intends to lay off (Lee, 1997; Worrell et al., 1991) . In addition, investors react more negatively when a firm makes a single layoff announcement than when it makes multiple announcements (Lee, 1997).
Unions and Shareholder Wealth. Unions, on behalf of their members, are viewed as competing with shareholders for corporate wealth. As a rule, the greater the level of unionization, the lower the profitability of the firm as measured by returns to shareholders (Becker and Olson, 1989; Hirsch, 1991) . So shareholders may perceive that their interests would be better served in nonunion, or less unionized, firms.
It is not simply a matter of labor costs, however. Certainly unions elevate the costs of wages and benefits, but offsetting productivity gains, where they are achieved, may neutralize the impact on labor costs (Belman, 1992) . Still, the perception that unions elevate labor costs continues to be a powerful impetus for management opposition to unionization (Rose and Chaison, 1996) . Unions may not extract monopoly profits, that is, claim larger shares in highly concentrated industries. Instead, unions compete for expenditures in discretionary areas such as research and development (Hirsch and Conholly, 1987) and capital investment (Voos and Mishel, 1986) . What is seen as good for the union and its members is generally viewed as detracting from shareholder wealth.
Shareholders do not need to rely exclusively on management to secure their interests vis-h-vis unions. Shareholders can also condition their investment decisions on various union activities and events. The event-methodology studies cited previously indicate that investors react negatively to union gains. They react negatively to union organizing efforts, and even more so when those organizing efforts are successful (Ruback and Zimmerman, 1984) , but they react positively when unions are decertified (Pearce et al., 1995) . They react negatively to strikes, depending on their duration and intensity (Becker and Olson, 1986) , and negatively to union wage gains (Abowd, 1989) ,
